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1. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2014, the Court of Justice (CJEU) ruled in Digital Rights Ireland
1
 that the mass 
metadata retention surveillance established in the EU by the Data Retention Directive
2
 
interfered disproportionately with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR). The judgment was hailed as a victory of fundamental rights over surveillance in 
Europe.
3
 In October 2015, a further major jurisprudential development occurred in the EU: 
following the Snowden revelations that the United States  has been operating a secret mass 
electronic surveillance programme that grants it access to Internet data, such as email, chat, 
videos, photos, and file transfers held by leading Internet companies, including Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Skype, Apple and Youtube, the CJEU in its judgment in Schrems
4
 
invalidated the Commission’s decision finding that the US ensured an adequate level of 
protection for the transfer of personal data under the Safe Harbour privacy principles. It did 
so on the basis that the US authorities were able to access the personal data transferred from 
EU Member States and process them beyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to 
the protection of national security. 
 The CJEU’s decision in Schrems is undoubtedly a significant judgment that marks 
another victory of fundamental rights, this time against international surveillance. Schrems 
raises a number of important legal questions, but the present article will focus on three 
aspects of the ruling that concern fundamental rights. Firstly, it will assess the admissibility 
issue concerning standing rights in secret surveillance cases in order to demonstrate the 
extensive scope of EU data privacy law. Secondly, it will discuss the implications of the 
judgment for transborder data flows and their regulation in the light of fundamental rights. 
Thirdly, it will focus on the challenges that the US secret mass electronic surveillance poses 
for fundamental rights. All of these three aspects of the Schrems judgment demonstrate the 
broad reach of EU fundamental rights law, and especially the right to privacy, which has been 
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 2 
brought into prominence by the CJEU’s recent judgments in Digital Rights Ireland, Google 
Spain
5
 and Schrems.  
However, two main lines of criticism will be advanced. The first concerns the 
fundamental rights analysis of the Court. Despite the obvious victory of fundamental rights 
over surveillance, the CJEU missed in Schrems the opportunity to discuss some crucial 
elements of the US online surveillance programme that further challenge EU fundamental 
rights. Moreover, the Court refrained from engaging with the inherent problem of today’s 
electronic surveillance programmes in general, viz the systematic government access to 
private-sector data. This raises the so-called ‘function-creep problem’ which goes to the heart 
of the right to data protection, a fundamental right recognized in the EU legal order in Article 
8 EUCFR alongside the right to privacy.
6
 Finally, the regrettable lack of depth of the CJEU’s 
analysis of the essence of fundamental rights will also be considered. The second line of 
criticism is broader and concerns the future developments for transatlantic data transfers and 
the safeguarding of EU citizens’ fundamental rights from US online surveillance after                        
the Schrems judgment.     
  
 
2. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Transatlantic trade is of critical importance for the economies of both the EU and the US. A 
crucial aspect of this relation, which makes possible the realization of transatlantic 
commercial transactions, is the transatlantic flow of personal data.
7
 Under the EU data 
protection legal framework, personal data can cross the EU’s external borders only if an 
‘adequate’ level of protection is ensured in the country of destination.8 The EU regulation of 
transborder data flows has been broadly based on a centralized model according to which the 
EU institutions – and, in particular, the Commission - decide whether a third country ensures 
adequate protection. In terms of the criteria used to assess the adequacy of protection, 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (the ‘Data Protection Directive’) stipulates that 
all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer and more particularly the nature of the data, 
the purpose of the proposed processing operation and the rules of law in force in the third 
country in question should be taken into consideration.
9
 According to the Working Document 
adopted by the Article 29 Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
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processing of personal data, an adequacy analysis essentially focuses on two basic elements: 
the content of the rules applicable and the means for ensuring their effective application.
 10 
 
The Commission has recognized a number of countries or jurisdictions as providing 
adequate protection.
11
 However, there has been no general adequacy finding for the US, 
given that it lacks comprehensive data protection legislation.
12
 In order to allow for 
international trade, transatlantic data flows between the EU and the US were made possible 
through the Safe Harbour scheme.
13
 Safe Harbour was based on a system of voluntary self-
certification and self-assessment of US-based companies that they abide with certain data 
protection principles, the ‘Safe Harbour principles,’ combined with some intervention by the 
public authorities. In particular, under the scheme, US companies were required to register 
their self-compliance with the Safe Harbour principles with the US Department of 
Commerce, while the US Federal Trading Commission (FTC) was responsible for enforcing 
the agreement. On the basis of this, the Commission issued Decision 2000/520/EC (hereafter 
‘the Safe Harbour Decision’) recognizing the adequacy of protection provided by the Safe 
Harbour principles.
14
 The Safe Harbour decision served as the legal basis for transfers of 
personal data from the EU to US – based companies which have adhered to the Safe Harbour 
privacy principles. Safe Harbour proved to be an important tool of transatlantic commercial 
relations, with over 3200 companies signing up to the scheme. However, the Snowden 
revelations in 2013 that the US’ National Security Agency (NSA) has been operating a secret 
mass electronic surveillance programme, PRISM, that grants it access to Internet data held by 
leading Internet companies
15
 raised serious concerns about the systematic access of US law 
enforcement authorities to data held by these companies and transferred to the US under the 
Safe Harbour scheme.
 16
  
The Schrems case arose from the proceedings between Mr Maximillian Schrems, an 
Austrian national residing in Austria, and the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (‘the 
Commissioner’). Mr Schrems, who had been a subscriber to the social network Facebook 
since 2008, lodged a complaint with the Commissioner in June 2013, by which he asked the 
latter to exercise his statutory powers by prohibiting Facebook Ireland from transferring his 
personal data to the US. Mr Schrems’s complaint was based on the fact that any person 
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residing in the EU who wishes to use Facebook is required to conclude, at the time of his 
registration, a contract with Facebook Ireland, a subsidiary of Facebook Inc., which is itself 
established in the US. Some or all of the personal data of Facebook Ireland’s users who 
reside in the European Union is transferred to servers belonging to Facebook Inc. located in 
the US, where it undergoes processing. In his complaint Mr Schrems referred to the 
revelations made by Edward Snowden concerning the activities of the US intelligence 
services, and in particular the PRISM programme, under which the NSA obtained access to 
mass data stored on servers in the United States owned or controlled by a range of companies 
active in the internet and technology field, such as Facebook USA. In this regard, he 
contended that the law and practice in force in the US did not ensure adequate protection of 
the personal data held in its territory against the surveillance activities that were engaged in 
there by the public authorities. The Commissioner rejected Mr Schrems’ complaint as 
‘frivolous or vexatious’ on the basis that it was unsustainable in law. Mr Schrems brought an 
action before the Irish High Court challenging the Commissioner’s decision. The High Court 
found that the mass and undifferentiated accessing of personal data was contrary to the 
principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights to privacy and to inviolability of the 
dwelling, protected by the Irish Constitution.
17
 However, the High Court considered that this 
case concerned the implementation of EU law and in particular it raised the issue of the 
legality of the Safe Harbour regime, established by Decision 2000/520 in the light of articles 
7 and 8 of the EU EUCFR.
18
 In this respect, the High Court decided to stay the proceedings 
and refer two preliminary questions to the Court asking whether National Data Protection 
Authorities (NDPAs) were bound by the Commission’s Safe Harbour adequacy decision or 
whether they could conduct their own investigation of the matter in the light of factual 
developments that arose after the publication of this decision. 
  
 
3. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
Following the Opinion of Advocate General Bot,
19
 the Court discussed two issues. The first 
concerned the powers of NDPAs to investigate complaints concerning transfers of personal 
data to a third country where it is alleged that this does not guarantee an adequate level of 
protection despite a Commission’s adequacy finding to the contrary. The second concerned 
the suspension of data transfers to the US under the Safe Harbour regime in light of Articles 7 
and 8 EUCFR on the basis that this did not provide adequate protection.  
 Insofar as the powers of the NDPAs were concerned, the CJEU held that NDPAs 
must be able to examine, with complete independence, whether transfers of data to third 
countries comply with fundamental rights and the requirements of the Data Protection 
Directive.
20
 The Court clarified how NDPAs should proceed in doing so, employing an a 
fortiori Foto-Frost
21
 argument that would enable it to have the final saying in a question of 
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validity. According to this, following Foto-Frost, national courts are entitled to consider the 
validity of an EU act, but they do not have the power to declare such an act invalid 
themselves; a fortiori, NDPAs can examine complaints on the compatibility of a 
Commission’s adequacy decision with fundamental rights, but they are not entitled to declare 
that decision invalid themselves.
22
 The CJEU distinguished two potential outcomes when 
NDPAs are asked to examine a complaint lodged by an individual regarding the transfer of 
his data to third countries: if the NDPA comes to the conclusion that it is unfounded and 
therefore rejects it, the individual can challenge this decision before the national courts –as 
Mr Schrems did- and the latter must stay the proceedings and make a reference to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling on validity.
23
 If the NDPA considers, however, that the individual’s 
claim is well-founded, it must engage in legal proceedings before the national courts in order 
for them to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the measure.
24
  
 On the basis of this pronouncement and in order to give the referring national court a 
full answer, the CJEU decided to examine the validity of the Commission’s adequacy 
decision 2000/520.
25
 Having explained that adequacy requires essentially a  level of 
protection of personal data in third countries equivalent to the one guaranteed within the 
EU,
26
 the CJEU went on to discuss Articles 1 and 3 of Decision 2000/520. It observed that 
the derogation to the Safe Harbour principles on the basis of ‘national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requirements’ constituted an interference with the fundamental 
right to privacy of the persons whose personal data is transferred from the EU to the US.
27
 
The US legislation was ‘not limited to what is strictly necessary’ since it authorised, on a 
generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been 
transferred from the EU to the US without any any differentiation, limitation or exception 
being made in the light of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion being laid 
down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities to the data, and 
of its subsequent use.
28
 In particular, the Court found that legislation permitting generalised 
access to the content of electronic communications compromises the essence of the 
fundamental right to privacy established in Article 7 EUCFR,
29
 and legislation not providing 
for legal remedies to individuals to access and obtain rectification or erasure of their data 
affects the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection enshrined in 
Article 47 EUCFR.
30
 The Court also held that Article 3 of Decision 2000/520 was 
problematic because it denied the NDPAs the powers granted by Article 28 of the Data 
Protection Directive to investigate complaints brought forward by individuals.
31
 Since the 
invalidity of Articles 1 and 3 of Decision 2000/520 affected the validity of the decision in its 
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entirety,
32
 the Court annulled the Commission’s adequacy decision regarding data transfers to 
the US under the Safe Harbour scheme.  
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Victim Status in Secret Surveillance: No ‘Frivolous or Vexatious’ Privacy Claims Under 
EU law 
It is significant that there are no standing requirements for the admissibility of secret 
surveillance claims under EU law. Unlike the Data Protection Commissioner, who considered 
that there was no evidence that Mr Schrem’s personal data held by Facebook had actually 
been accessed by the NSA and, therefore, rejected his complaint as ‘frivolous or vexatious’, 
neither the AG nor the Court raised any issue of victim status for the admissibility of 
complaints about secret surveillance. This is in accordance to long established CJEU case-
law, pursuant to which data protection law applies irrespective of whether an individual has 
suffered actual damage or harm.
33
  
This approach should be distinguished from the one adopted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding admissibility of complaints in secret surveillance cases. 
The Court has repeatedly held that the Convention does not provide for an actio popularis 
and the ECtHR does not normally review the law and practice in abstracto.
34
 Therefore, in 
order to be able to lodge an application an individual was required to show that he was 
‘directly affected’ by the measure complained of.35 The ECtHR recognized, however, that 
this might prove problematic in cases of secret surveillance. In Klass v. Germany the Court 
held that an individual might, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation 
occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret 
measures, without having to allege that such measures had been in fact applied to him.
36
 The 
Court explained the reasons for its approach as follows: where a State institutes secret 
surveillance the existence of which remains unknown to the persons being controlled, this 
means necessarily that the surveillance remains unchallengeable because the persons 
concerned are unaware of the violation.
37
 According to the ECtHR, such surveillance 
measures could reduce Article 8 ECHR to a nullity and, therefore the Court stated that an 
applicant is entitled to ‘(claim) to be the victim of a violation of the Convention, even though 
he is not able to allege in support of his application that he has been subject to a concrete 
measure of surveillance.’38 Following Klass, however, the ECtHR followed in its case law 
two different approaches to victim status in secret surveillance cases. In some cases, the 
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applicant was required to show a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the security services had 
intercepted information concerning his private life.
39
 In other cases, the Court reiterated its 
pronouncement in Klass and agreed to hear cases where a mere existence of secret 
surveillance laws entailed ‘a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation might 
be applied’.40  
It should be noted that the ECtHR sought to clarify its case law in Kennedy
41
 and 
further explained it and consolidated in its recent judgment in Zakharov.
42
 According to the 
ECtHR secret surveillance cases will be reviewed under two conditions: first, legislation can 
be challenged when the applicant is considered to be ‘potentially at risk’ of being subjected to 
such measures; secondly, the Court will consider the availability of remedies at the national 
level and adjust the degree of scrutiny depending on the effectiveness of such remedies.
43
 
Where the domestic system does not afford an effective remedy to the person who suspects 
that he was subjected to secret surveillance, ‘the menace of surveillance’ can constitute an 
interference with Article 8 ECHR. In such instances, the ECtHR opined that there is a greater 
need for scrutiny by the Court and, thus, an exception to the rule, which denies individuals 
the right to challenge a law in abstracto, is justified.  
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that a strict standing condition for challenging 
surveillance measures targeting non-US nationals exists in the US since the US Supreme 
Court has held in Clapper v Amnesty International
44
 that neither individuals nor 
organizations have standing to bring a lawsuit under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance (FISA) Amendments Act (FAA) because they cannot know whether they have 
been subject to surveillance or not. 
 
B. Transnational Data Transfers and ‘Adequacy’ of Protection: Extraterritorial Application of 
EU Fundamental Rights? 
Global trade has brought with it an ‘information explosion’, where personal data is 
considered ‘crucial raw materials of the global economy’45. As a result, cross-border data 
flows have grown massively in volume and complexity.
46
 There are a number of risks 
associated with transborder data transfers,
47
 which have prompted governments around the 
world to regulate them in order to protect the fundamental rights to data protection and 
privacy of individuals and to ensure their own ‘informational sovereignty’.48 Among the 
systems adopted worldwide to regulate transborder data flows, the EU’s adequacy 
requirement under the Data Protection Directive – that will be retained and further 
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strengthened in the General Data Protection Regulation
49
 - has been characterized as 
‘gunboat diplomacy’50 that has prompted many countries to change their data protection rules 
– or indeed introduce new ones- in order to be able to receive data transfers from the EU.51 
Although it has been argued that the Safe Harbour scheme has levelled up US privacy 
protection standards,
52
 the voluntary system of US companies’ self-certification has revealed 
low levels of compliance with the basic data protection principles of the scheme
53
 and several 
weaknesses in transparency and enforcement.
54
   
The Court took the opportunity in Schrems to clarify the adequacy criterion. While 
noting that there was no definition provided in law of the concept of an adequate level of 
protection,
55
 the CJEU observed that adequacy does not require a level of protection 
‘identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order’, but nevertheless protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms that is ‘essentially equivalent’ to the one of the EU.56 This 
requires an assessment of the content of the applicable domestic and international law rules in 
the third country as well as the practice designed to ensure compliance with those rules. The 
‘essentially equivalent’ criterion shows that the Court is trying to bring external legal systems 
as close as possible to the EU’s internal data protection legal framework57 in order to ensure 
that domestic data protection rules are not circumvented by transfers of personal data from 
the EU to third countries.
58
 
 This means that the CJEU is taking a stricter approach to international data transfers 
than the one adopted 13 years earlier in Lindqvist.
59
 In that case, which concerned a Swedish 
woman who set up an Internet page and loaded there personal data concerning her colleagues, 
the Court stated that even if such data is accessible to persons in third countries, one cannot 
presume that transfers of data to third countries under EU law were intended to cover 
situations  such as where an individual loads data on an Internet page.
60
 This pragmatic 
approach adopted by the Court seemed to be based on a consideration of the potential 
consequences of a contrary decision, which could ‘effectively make the entire Internet subject 
to EU data protection law’.61 Such an approach appears to be significantly restricted in recent 
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case law and replaced by a more privacy-proactive approach that brings the Internet under 
EU data protection law. This line of jurisprudence started in Google Spain
62
 where the Court 
held that, in certain circumstances, Internet search engines are required under EU law to 
delist links concerning individuals from their results. Admittedly the data protection issues 
raised in Schrems are significantly different from the ones that arose in Lindqvist, but faced 
with mass surveillance the Court seems to be moving towards a more stringent approach, in 
accordance with its role as the constitutional court preserving the rule of law in the EU legal 
order.  
 There is a second element that differentiates Schrems from Lindqvist. Since the latter 
was decided, data protection has been recognized as a fundamental right in the EUCFR 
alongside the right to privacy. This necessarily means that transborder data flows should be 
regarded now as part of the EU institutions’ fundamental rights protective duty.63 In this 
respect, the Court stated that individuals cannot be deprived of their fundamental rights by 
the transfer of their data to third countries.
64
 A valid argument can be made, therefore, in 
favour of the extraterritorial application of EU data protection standards.
65
 The judgment of 
the Court in Schrems confirms this. The Court adopted a broader application of its 
fundamental rights law to cover data processing in the US. However, it did so in a cautious 
way: it dealt with the problems of the Commission’s adequacy decision, rather than directly 
challenging the US legislation. This approach is reminiscent of the one followed in its 
seminal Kadi
66
 decision: there as well the Court did not review directly the UNSC 
resolutions, but the EU measures implementing these.
67
     
 The new powers of NDPAs to investigate complaints of individuals regarding the 
adequacy of data protection provided in third countries, as confirmed in Schrems, can be seen 
as an additional safeguard concerning the application of these fundamental rights outside the 
EU’s territory. Until now, only the Commission was responsible for making an assessment of 
adequacy; after Schrems NDPAs are also granted the important role of investigating 
individuals’ complaints alleging a third country’s non-compliance with EU fundamental 
rights, despite a Commission’s adequacy decision on the matter. This means that NDPAs, 
alongside their current powers to oversee the application of data protection laws in the 
territories of their respective Member States, also have the power to review the 
extraterritorial application of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection when 
personal data is transferred from their home country to a third country. The final decision, 
however, on whether a third country does not ensure adequate protection is left to the CJEU 
as NDPAs do not have the power to invalidate a Commission’s adequacy decision, but 
merely to investigate complaints and -if they consider them well-founded- initiate 
proceedings before national courts, which must then make a preliminary reference to the 
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CJEU. The European Court, thus, retained for itself the role of the ultimate adjudicator of the 
adequacy of the protection of fundamental rights outside the EU.   
 
 
C. US Mass Online Surveillance and Fundamental Rights 
The Court also considered issues relating to mass surveillance in its landmark decision in 
Digital Rights Ireland. There the CJEU annulled the Data Retention Directive on the basis 
that it affected in a generalized and comprehensive manner all persons using electronic 
communications services in the EU.
68
 While the Court’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland 
demonstrated that domestic measures of mass surveillance interfered disproportionately with 
fundamental rights, in Schrems the CJEU sent the message that mass surveillance of 
European citizens would not be tolerated outside the borders of the EU either. The Court’s 
judgment is not surprising. Indeed, since the Court annulled the Data Retention Directive, 
which required the collection of telecommunications’ metadata by service providers in order 
to be made available to law enforcement authorities for the purposes of fighting ‘serious 
crime’, it seemed that the US secret mass electronic surveillance would be most unlikely to 
survive scrutiny under EU law. In particular, the CJEU reiterated in Schrems that legislation 
authorizing on a generalised basis storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose 
data has been transferred from the European Union to the US without any differentiation 
being made in the light of the objective pursued was not limited to what is strictly necessary.  
The CJEU fundamental rights’ analysis in Schrems is different, however, from the 
one in Digital Rights Ireland. In the latter case, the Court concluded that, while the Data 
Retention Directive did not affect the essence of Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR, it had exceeded the 
limits imposed by the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52 (1) 
EUCFR.
69
 In Schrems the Court did not engage in any further analysis with regard to the 
principle of proportionality because it found that the essence of both the fundamental rights 
to privacy and to effective judicial protection under Article 47 EUCFR had been affected. 
There are two major reasons justifying why the US mass online surveillance programmes, 
such as PRISM, violate EU fundamental rights.
70
 The first concerned the broad scope of 
PRISM, which grants access on a generalized basis not only to communications’ metadata – 
as was the case with the Data Retention Directive - but to the actual content of electronic 
communications. This was deemed by the Court to breach the essence of the right to privacy. 
The second, a systemic one, has to do with the fact that the US legislation does not provide 
EU citizens with sufficient guarantees and effective legal remedies to exercise their data 
access, rectification and erasure rights. On the one hand, the remedies available under the 
Safe Harbour scheme -the private dispute resolution mechanisms and the procedures before 
the FTC - did not cover complaints on fundamental rights questions as they were limited to 
unfair or deceptive acts and practices in commerce and could not deal with the US’ 
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69
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70
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authorities access to the data held by the companies.
71
 On the other hand, the US privacy 
regime is not as protective as the EU one and there are serious limitations regarding the rights 
of EU citizens to challenge surveillance measures in the US. The Fourth Amendment, which 
constitutes the US constitutional prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure is 
substantially limited by the ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine and it is doubtful whether it 
applies to non-US persons.
72
 Regarding protection from intelligence surveillance, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (the ‘FISC’), which exercises supervisory jurisdiction under 
section 702 of the FISA does not offer remedies to EU citizens whose personal data is 
transferred to the US, because this applies only to US citizens and foreign citizens legally 
resident on a permanent basis in the United States.
73
 Furthermore, the proceedings before the 
FISC are secret and ex parte.
74
 This lack of legal remedies was considered by the Court to 
violate the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by 
Article 47 EUCFR.  
However, there are two further problems with US mass surveillance that the CJEU 
did not discuss. First, there is a total lack of transparency regarding PRISM, which operates 
as a secret programme at least in practice, if not in law. Starting with the legal basis of 
PRISM, this seems to be found in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (‘FAA’) which 
allows US intelligence surveillance to seek access to information, including the content of 
internet communications, by targeting a non-United States person who is ‘reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States’. In accordance with this, the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize surveillance upon the 
issuance of an order from the FISC without showing a probable cause or any other standard 
to believe that the individuals are properly targeted; what is required is merely that ‘a 
significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information’.75 In 
practice, the operation of the programme was obscured and only brought to light and made 
known in the EU because of the Snowden revelations. It is regrettable, therefore, that the 
CJEU did not even mention in Schrems the requirement of ‘provided for by law’ under 
Article 52 (1) EUCFR and the ‘in accordance with the law’ condition under Article 8 (2) 
ECHR on the basis of Article 52 (3) EUCFR. The ECtHR has repeatedly held in this respect 
that the law must be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects in 
order to satisfy this requirement.
76
 While the ECtHR has accepted that ‘foreseeability’ in the 
context of secret surveillance cannot be the same as in other fields, the risks of arbitrariness 
of the powers vested in the executive are higher, therefore surveillance rules must be clear 
and detailed and citizens must be given adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
                                                     
71
 Schrems, supra n 4 at para 89. 
72
 Note by Bowden, Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, Policy Department C: 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘The US Surveillance Programmes and Their Impact on EU 
Citizens’ Fundamental Rights’ (2013) at 20. 
73
 Tourkochoriti supra n 7 at 487. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 See Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, ‘Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’ (‘PCLOB Report’), 2 July 2014) available at: < 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf> , [last accessed 4 April 2016].  
76
 See among others Rotaru v Romania, Application No. 28341/95 ECHR Reports 2000‑V at para 52; and S. 
and Marper v the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR Reports 2008 at para 95. 
 12 
public authorities can resort to such measures.
77
 It seems debatable that these requirements 
were met under the US secret online surveillance measures, given that EU citizens became 
aware of them only after the Snowden revelations in the media.   
There is also another problematic aspect of PRISM that the CJEU did not mention: 
the fact that this is inherently discriminatory on grounds of nationality. As the report 
presented before the European Parliament noted:  
 
According to the leaked ‘targeting procedures’ (dated 2009) of FAA known 
Americans [are eliminated] from being inadvertently targeted by section 702. 
Analysts may only proceed to access ‘content data’ under the 702 power if there is 
more than a 50% likelihood the target is not American and located outside the US, 
because the Fourth Amendment was held not to apply…This shows that the ‘probable 
cause’ requirement for evidence of a 50% likelihood of criminality was converted into 
a 50% probability of nationality.
78
  
  
In addition to the Court’s omissions of some problematic aspects of the US 
surveillance programme, also notable is the absence of the fundamental right to data 
protection enshrined in Article 8 EUCFR from the Court’s analysis of the fundamental rights 
with which mass electronic surveillance interferes. In particular, the CJEU referred only 
twice to the fundamental right to data protection in its judgment: in paragraph 72, where the 
Court pointed out that the adequacy requirement under Article 25 (6) of the Data Protection 
Directive ‘implements the express obligation laid down in Article 8 (1) of the Charter to 
protect personal data’, and in paragraph 92, where the Court repeated its pronouncement in 
Digital Rights Ireland that the protection of the fundamental right to privacy at EU level 
requires derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data to apply 
only in so far as is strictly necessary. It is surprising, however, that unlike Digital Rights 
Ireland, the substantive fundamental rights’ analysis of the Court in Schrems took place only 
on the basis of Articles 7 and 47 EUCFR, without any further mention of the right to data 
protection. It is submitted that the absence of the fundamental right to data protection from 
the Court’s analysis is regrettable because mass electronic surveillance, based on the 
systematic government access to private-sector data may lead to the ‘function creep’ 
problem:  data can be accessed by different bodies and further processed in order to pursue 
different objectives from the ones for which the data was initially collected, just because it is 
readily available and the relevant technology exists.
79
  ‘Function creep’ goes against the heart 
of a central data protection principle, the purpose limitation principle. ‘Purpose specification 
and limitation’, which requires that personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and should not be further processed in a way incompatible with the initial 
purposes,
80
 embodies the values of transparency, foreseeability in data processing and 
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accountability of data controllers in order to mitigate the inherent power asymmetries in data 
protection law between data subjects and data controllers and is, thus, another expression of 
the right to informational self-determination.
81
 The systematic government access to private-
sector data
82
 in order to fight terrorism challenges the very essence of the purpose limitation 
principle. The personal data that EU citizens transferred to companies such as Facebook in 
order to be able to use their respective services are accessed by the US authorities in a way 
incompatible with the grounds on which the data was originally collected for: completely 
unrelated commercial purposes.
83
 By not including the right to data protection in its analysis, 
the Court missed an opportunity to clarify whether the purpose limitation principle is ‘dead’ 
in the Internet era of mass electronic surveillance.   
Finally, while it is understandable that the CJEU did not assess in detail the 
proportionality of US mass surveillance measures because it considered the interference to be 
so serious as to affect the essence of the fundamental rights to privacy and effective judicial 
review, the lack of depth of its analysis of the essence of fundamental rights is particularly 
disturbing. The Court has often held that restrictions to fundamental rights are justified when 
they do not impair ‘the very substance of the rights guaranteed.’84 Nevertheless, it has been 
ambiguous on whether the essence of fundamental rights under Article 51 (2) EUCFR refers 
to the common and universal essence of a fundamental right or whether it can have a 
different meaning in each particular case.
85
 The judgments in Digital Rights Ireland and 
Schrems did not shed light on this question. The line drawn between public authorities 
accessing the content of communications or not, which seemed to be determinant of the 
Court’s assessment of whether the essence of the fundamental right to privacy was infringed, 
presents only a superficial analysis of what constitutes the essence of the fundamental right to 
privacy. Given that the CJEU, unlike the ECtHR, is not a specialized human rights court, it is 
very regrettable that it did not engage in a more thorough discussion of the essence of 
fundamental rights drawing inspiration from a comparative perspective
86
 and from national 
and supranational Courts that have assessed the issue,
87
 such as the ECtHR
88
  and the German 
Constitutional Court.  
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D. What Now For Transatlantic Data Flows and Protection of EU Citizens’ Fundamental 
Rights from US Surveillance? 
The annulment of the Commission’s Safe Harbour adequacy decision has important practical 
consequences, on the one hand, for commercial data transfers to the US and the everyday 
operations of Internet giants, and, on the other hand, for the access of law enforcement 
authorities to commercial data in order to fight terrorism. There are, therefore, two pertinent 
questions that need to be answered after the Court’s judgment in Schrems. What happens to 
transatlantic data transfers now? And, under which conditions can the US authorities (still) 
access EU citizens’ data held by private companies in a manner that means that they do not 
violate fundamental EU rights? The two questions seem inextricably linked to each other 
given that the CJEU invalidated the Safe Harbour scheme on the ground that US mass 
electronic surveillance did not respect the essence of EU fundamental rights. Yet, there might 
be good reasons to deal with these two issues separately.  
  Insofar as transatlantic data flows are concerned, the first obvious ramification of the 
invalidation of the Commission’s adequacy decision is that Safe Harbour cannot serve 
anymore as a legal basis for data transfers to the US.
89
 A number of possible short and 
longer-term solutions are available at different levels: individual-initiated, private-sector 
initiated, technological solutions and legislative solutions.
90
 Article 26 (1) of the Data 
Protection Directive provides that data can be transferred to third countries even when those 
do not ensure an adequate level of protection, a) on the basis of the consent of the data 
subject; or b) when the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the 
data subject and the controller. Individuals based in the EU could use this provision in order 
to continue to use the services of US-based Internet companies, such as Facebook or Google.
 
A second set of solutions could be private-sector initiated: US undertakings collecting and 
processing data of EU citizens could store this data solely in Europe in order to prevent them 
from being accessed by US authorities. It should be recalled that this solution was adopted by 
SWIFT in the wake of the revelations that the US had established a secret Terrorist Financing 
Tracking Programme (TFTP), under which the US Department of Treasury in collaboration 
with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collected and analysed for counter-terrorism 
purposes huge amounts of data from SWIFT’s database. 91 Another possibility for companies 
comes under Article 26 (2) of the Data Protection Directive. According to this, Member 
States may authorize a transfer to a third country that does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection, ‘where the controller adduces adequate safeguards’ under either the so-called 
‘standard contractual clauses’ approved by the Commission or the ‘ad hoc’ clauses drafted by 
the undertakings and approved by the relevant DPA.
92
 Finally, it should be noted that 
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technological solutions, such as the encryption of personal data originating from the EU do 
not seem to offer effective protection from US surveillance.  
 The most comprehensive solution seems to be the adoption of a new Commission 
adequacy decision which will provide the legal basis for data transfers to the US on the basis 
of a new privacy transfer scheme that will replace Safe Harbour. Adequacy can be asserted 
only if the new data transfer regime complies with the requirements that the Court set out in 
Schrems: no access of the US authorities to the content of the data, sufficient safeguards and 
effective judicial mechanisms for the data subjects, and no circumscription of the NDPAs 
powers.
93
 On 2 February 2016, the Commission announced that a political agreement was 
reached on a new framework for transatlantic data flows, the EU-US Privacy Shield, which 
will replace the annulled Safe Harbour system.
94
 On 29 February 2016, the Commission 
published a draft Privacy Shield adequacy decision,
95
 followed by seven Annexes that 
include the US government’s written commitments on the enforcement of the arrangement.96 
Similar to its predecessor, Privacy Shield is based on a system of self-certification by which 
US organisations commit to a set of privacy principles. However, unlike Safe Harbour, the 
draft Privacy Shield decision includes a section on the ‘access and use of personal data 
transferred under the EU-US Privacy Shield by US public authorities’.97 In this, the 
Commission concludes that ‘there are rules in place in the United States designed to limit any 
interference for national security purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons whose 
personal data are transferred from the EU to the US to what is strictly necessary to achieve 
the legitimate objective.’98 This conclusion is based on the assurances provided by the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Annex VI), the US Department of Justice 
(Annex VII) and the US Secretary of State (Annex III), which describe the current 
limitations, oversight and opportunities for judicial redress under the US surveillance 
programmes. In particular, the Commission employed four main arguments arising from 
these letters to reach its adequacy conclusion. Firstly, US surveillance prioritizes targeted 
collection of personal data, while bulk collection is limited to exceptional situations where 
targeted collection is not possible for technical or operational reasons (this captures the 
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essence of the principles of necessity and proportionality, according to the Commission).
99
 
Secondly, US intelligence activities are subject to ‘extensive oversight from within the 
executive branch’100 and, to some extent, from courts such as the FISC.101 Thirdly, three main 
avenues of redress are available under US law to EU data subjects depending on the 
complaint they want to raise: interference under FISA; unlawful, intentional access to 
personal data by government officials; and access to information under Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).
102
 Fourthly, a new mechanism will be created under the Privacy 
Shield, namely the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson who will be a Senior Coordinator (at the 
level of Under-Secretary) in the State Department in order to guarantee that individual 
complaints are investigated and individuals receive independent confirmation that US laws 
have been complied with or, in case of a violation of such laws, the non-compliance has been 
remedied.
103
 
Despite the plethora of privacy-friendly words (‘Privacy Shield’, ‘robust obligations’, 
‘clear limitations and safeguards’), one cannot be very optimistic that the new regime will 
fully comply with the Court’s judgment. A first problematic aspect with the US assurances is 
that they describe the US surveillance legal framework and the relevant safeguards that 
already exist. The Commission observes in its draft decision that this legal framework has 
been ‘significantly strengthened’ since the 2013 Snowden revelations. This assumption is 
based on two legal developments: the issuance of Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) 
which set out a number of principles on the collection and use of ‘signal intelligence’ data;104 
and the passing of the USA Freedom Act which imposed some limits on the mass collection 
of US persons’ telecommunications metadata by US intelligence authorities.105 Given that 
one can legitimately assume that the Court was aware of these developments when laying 
down its judgment in Schrems in October 2015,
106
 it seems that, with the exception of the 
Ombudsperson, Privacy Shield does not change much in US surveillance law. In fact, the 
Commission has entirely based its draft adequacy analysis on a mere detailed description of 
this law without any further commitment that this will improve in any way in order to comply 
with EU fundamental rights as interpreted by the CJEU.  
While the assurance that US surveillance is mainly targeted and does not take place in 
bulk is certainly important, there is no reference to the fact that US authorities access the 
content of the personal data that was deemed to violate the essence of the right to privacy in 
Schrems. Furthermore, PPD-28 allows for the bulk collection of signals intelligence data 
when deemed necessary ‘in order to identify new or emerging threats.’107 This information 
can then be used for six purposes, including counter-terrorism and other forms of serious 
(transnational) crimes.
108
 In this respect, the 29WP observed that this purpose limitation 
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appears too wide to be considered as ‘targeted.’109 Moreover, even if the US authorities 
engage only in targeted surveillance, the CJEU has held in Digital Rights Ireland that the 
mere retention of private-sector data for the purpose of making it available to national 
authorities affects Articles 7 and 8 EUCFR
110
 and might have a chilling effect on the use by 
subscribers of platforms of communication, such as Facebook and, consequently, on their 
exercise of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 11 EUCFR.
111
 When faced with 
surveillance, individuals cannot know when they are targeted; nevertheless, the possibility of 
being the object of surveillance has an effect on the way they behave.
112
 Insofar as Article 47 
EUCFR and the right to effective judicial protection is concerned, the Commission itself 
notes in its draft adequacy decision that the avenues of redress provided to EU citizens do not 
cover all the legal bases that US intelligence authorities may use and the individuals 
opportunities to challenge FISA are very limited due to the strict standing requirements.
113
 
The recently adopted Judicial Redress Act
114
 that aims to provide equal treatment of EU 
citizens with US citizens with regard to judicial redress avenues does not sufficiently address 
these concerns as it does not apply to national security and is fraught with exceptions.
115
   
The creation of the Ombudsperson with the important function of ensuring individual 
redress and independent oversight should be welcomed as the main addition of the draft 
Privacy Shield. Individuals will be able to access the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson without 
having to demonstrate that their personal data has in fact been accessed by the US 
intelligence activities, and the Ombudsperson, who will be carrying out his functions 
independently from Instructions by the US Intelligence Community, will be able to rely on 
the US oversight and review mechanisms. However, there are several limitations to the 
function of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson. First, the procedure for accessing the 
Ombudsperson is not as straightforward as lodging a complaint before NDPAs. Individuals 
have to submit their requests initially to the Member States’ bodies competent for the 
oversight of national security services and, eventually, a centralized EU individual complaint 
handling body that will channel them to the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson if they are deemed 
‘complete’.116 In terms of the outcome of the Ombudsperson’s investigation, the 
Ombudsperson will provide a response to the submitting EU individual complaint handling 
body –who will then communicate with the individual- confirming (i) that the complaint has 
been properly investigated, and (ii) that the US law has been complied with, or, in the event 
of non-compliance, such non-compliance has been remedied.
117
 However, the Ombudsperson 
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will neither confirm nor deny whether the individual has been the target of surveillance nor 
will the Ombudsperson confirm the specific remedy that was applied.
118
 Finally, Annex III 
stipulates that commitments in the Ombudsperson’s Memorandum will not apply to general 
claims that the EU-US Privacy Shield is inconsistent with EU data protection 
requirements.
119
 In the light of the above, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson does not seem to 
provide the redress guarantees of an independent supervisory authority
120
 such as the NDPAs.  
Draft Privacy Shield is problematic for another reason as well: it puts together the 
regulative framework for commercial transactions with the regulation for law enforcement 
access to private sector data. These are, however, different issues and they should be dealt 
with separately. It is important to encourage and facilitate transborder trade, thus flexible 
mechanisms allowing for undertakings self-compliance with data protection principles should 
continue to apply. But, the challenges of online surveillance on fundamental rights are too 
serious to be regularized
121
 and covered by the same regime and some ‘assurances’ that 
essentially describe the current US law. The adoption of a transatlantic privacy and data 
protection framework that also ensures the transparency and accountability of transnational 
counter-terrorism operations could be a possible solution to this problem. Regrettably, the 
current Agreement negotiated between the EU and the US on the protection of personal data 
when transferred and processed for law enforcement purposes (the ‘Umbrella’ Agreement)122 
does not apply to intelligence agencies operations and raises serious concerns as to its 
compatibility with EU fundamental rights.
123
 Thus, the best option for the moment would be 
the accession of the US to  the Council of Europe Convention 108
124
 and its Additional 
Protocol.
125
 These contain a comprehensive framework of data protection safeguards and 
some enforcement mechanisms and are open to accession by non-Member States.
126
  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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The Schrems judgment undoubtedly features as a constitutional decision marking the judicial 
protection of fundamental rights in the area of counter-terrorism. It marks a significant 
vindication of the right to privacy vis-à-vis modern electronic surveillance techniques and 
sends out a strong message that the mere availability of personal data held by private-sector 
companies does not justify access to them by public authorities even for the purpose of 
achieving important objectives such as fighting terrorism. This is a point that strongly defies 
the different letters of assurances received by the Commission from the US in the aftermath 
of the Schrems judgment, according to which, US authorities target only certain individuals. 
The mere fact that the data of potentially all EU citizens held by US Internet companies can 
be accessed by law enforcement and intelligence authorities is enough to trigger the 
application of the fundamental right to privacy and create a chilling effect on individuals’ 
freedom of expression.  
 The CJEU’s judgment can also been read as championing once again privacy activism 
following the Court’s line of reasoning in its decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Google 
Spain. The broad reach and interpretation of EU data protection law is evidenced, first, by the 
fact that, according to long established case-law there are no standing requirements for 
challenging secret surveillance in the EU legal order or in general alleging interference with 
the right to privacy. Furthermore, the strengthening of the interpretation of the ‘adequacy’ 
criterion for transborder data transfers in Schrems opens up the path to the application of EU 
privacy rights to third countries and even to the virtual borderless space of the Internet. 
Nevertheless, as discussed, the Court’s fundamental rights’ analysis has significant gaps and 
omissions. 
  Finally, it is worth pondering upon the legislative developments triggered in the 
aftermath of the Schrems judgment. The currently negotiated Privacy Shield that will replace 
the invalidated Safe Harbour system fails to address the CJEU’s fundamental rights concerns 
in many respects: its fundamental rights safeguards are seriously limited and it conflates the 
regime for transatlantic data transfers with the need for regulation of counter-terrorism 
operations. Its only novelty, the creation of an Ombudsperson does not guarantee full redress 
for individuals. Thus, the Court may have stricken in Schrems another blow against online 
electronic surveillance in the name of fundamental rights, but the reality seems to be that 
little will change on the other side of the Atlantic. Should the Commission nevertheless 
decide to proceed with the current draft, the Court might be called in the future to examine 
the validity of Privacy Shield in the light of EU fundamental rights in a Schrems 2 case. 
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